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THE EXAMPLE OF LESBIANS:
A POSTHUMOUS REPLY TO PROFESSOR
MARY JOE FRUG
Ruth Colker*
The struggle now is how to prevent [Mary Joe Frug's] death from being
a premature closure of the work she was pursuing, how to carry on
without one of our most exciting and challenging feminist legal theo-
rists. The post-modern talk of "ruptures" and "prying apart crevices"
has a horrible, violent ring to me; but we must not let Mary Joe Frug's
death stand as the ultimate rejection of her position in a discussion
that must, somehow, continue.'
FRANCES OLSEN
I. INTRODUCTION
How do you respond to an unfinished manuscript written by a
friend who was tragically murdered less than one year ago when you
continue to see images of her sitting on a couch talking to you jux-
taposed with images of her lying dead on a street in Cambridge? The
manuscript is filled with images of violence and death, as if Mary Joe
were foreshadowing her own passing from this world. 2 I want to talk
to Mary Joe about the manuscript. What did you mean, here and
there? How were you intending to finish it? What troubled you about
it that you intended to revise?
On many levels, I cannot read the manuscript at all. I have no
idea what Mary Joe intended to say; the image of her death speaks
* Professor of Law, Tulane University.
I met Mary Joe Frug at the New England School of Law in the fall of 1984 when I was
seeking a full-time teaching position. She was probably the warmest and most helpful person
that I met during my interviews. Had she not extended her encouragement and advice, I might
not have continued to pursue a teaching position, and thus might not have been invited to
respond to her manuscript. In Judaism, we believe that those who are gone live eternally
through their good deeds. I am sure that Mary Joe has a very long life ahead of her through
our memories.
I would like to thank John Stick for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Lorena
Dumas for her diligent research assistance.
1 Frances Olsen, In Memoriam: Mary Joe Frug, 14 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. i, vii (i99i).
2 She observes that her notes are often labelled "PM," referring to postmodernism, but that
those notes could also refer to premenstrual and postmenopausal blues. See Mary Joe Frug, A
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), io5 HARV. L. REv. 1045, io46
(1992). Ironically, they could also refer to "postmortem."
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louder to me than the images evoked by her live written words. As
a postmodernist, Mary Joe would have agreed that such symbols and
imagery are powerful. Nevertheless, as Professor Fran Olsen has so
eloquently articulated, we should not allow Mary Joe's death to end
the discussion about her work. In this essay, I have tried to take her
work one step further by extending it to the example of lesbians, to
whom she alluded in her manuscript through a sentence that was left
incomplete by her tragic death.
3
Professor Frug's Commentary would be much richer if she had
been more attentive to the anti-essentialist perspective. Gender essen-
tialism is "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience
can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual
orientation, and other realities of experience."'4 An anti-essentialist
perspective notes that when we speak of "women" unmodified, we are
in fact often talking about white, middle-class, able-bodied, hetero-
sexual, adult women. An anti-essentialist perspective tries to talk
about women in a way that embraces the important differences among
women.5
Applying an anti-essentialist perspective to Professor Frug's manu-
script reveals that many of the generalizations she makes about women
are not accurate when applied to various subgroups of women, such
as lesbians. 6 Professor Frug's central thesis is that law - by permit-
ting and sometimes mandating the sexualization, terrorization, and
maternalization of the female body - constructs the female body in
three ways. 7 To support this thesis, she discusses prostitution, family
and work, sexuality, and the anti-pornography movement. She had
intended to apply these observations to the abortion rights movement
as well.8 An anti-essentialist perspective reveals that many of the
rules that Professor Frug describes as having a negative sexualizing,
3 Her husband has told me that the sentence discussing lesbians is incomplete because she
was writing it when she took her fatal walk. See Letter from Gerald E. Frug, Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School, to Ruth Colker, Professor of Law, Tulane University (Nov. 13,
199
i ) (on file at the Harvard Law School Library).
4 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STA. L. REv.
581, 585 (,990).
5 For further discussion of what I mean by "anti-essentialism," see Ruth Colker, An Equal
Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class,
199i DuKE L.J. 324, 326-28. Like Professor Frug, I do not interpret the anti-essentialism
perspective as making it impossible for us to generalize about women. Nevertheless, it demands
that we be cautious when making those generalizations.
6 Professor Frug tried to embrace anti-essentialism in her own work. Her unfinished attempt
to discuss lesbians, for example, see Frug, supra note 2, at io66, exemplified her acknowledge-
ment of the differences among women. Had she been able to finish her manuscript, she may
have made many of the observations that I make in this Commentary.
7 See id. 1049-5o.
8 See id. at io67-68.
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maternalizing, or terrorizing effect on some heterosexual women have
an enhanced or different effect on some lesbians. 9 In some instances,
these rules have a similar effect on lesbians and heterosexual women;
in others, the effect may be detrimental to heterosexual women, yet
it may improve the lives of some lesbians. Nevertheless, the appli-
cation of an anti-essentialist perspective strengthens Professor Frug's
central observation that society constructs women's bodies. This per-
spective reveals that, although legal rules simultaneously have dispar-
ate effects on different groups of women, the rules reinforce a single
definition of "femininity." Sojourner Truth's famous response to ste-
reotypes about women's fragility that did not apply to African-Amer-
ican women - "Ain't I a Woman?"' 0 - is a reminder that certain
women have always been excluded from the category "female" to
facilitate the socialization of other women as female. Lesbians, the
subject of this Commentary, are one example of women who tradi-
tionally have been excluded from the category "female."
II. SEXUALIZATION, TERRORIZATION, AND MATERNALIZATION
A. Sexualization
The laws relating to prostitution, Professor Frug argues, sexualize
the female body by making women concerned that they are acting
like whores.11 Women's attractiveness to men comes in part from
acting a little, but not too much, like a whore. In addition, she argues
that prostitution rules, as well as rules governing social violence and
the family, sexualize women by leading them to believe that they must
be sexually monogamous. These arguments are premised on the as-
sumption that all sex workers are heterosexual and that all women
are sexualized into exclusive, monogamous heterosexuality. By "sex-
ualization," Professor Frug apparently means "heterosexualization"
and thereby insufficiently recognizes the lesbian experience in the
construction of her arguments.
Heterosexual women are socialized to make themselves attractive
to men, and consequently they need to be concerned about the whore
stereotype. Some lesbians, 12 however, do not orient themselves to-
9 Lesbians are not homogeneous. An anti-essentialist perspective requires that we explore
differences among lesbians as well as differences between lesbians and heterosexual women.
10 ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 14 (1988) (quoting Sojourner Truth).
11 See Frug, supra note 2, at 1052.
12 1 say "some lesbians" because there are many lesbians who try to "pass" as heterosexuals
by dressing in a "feminine" manner. Other lesbians who are "out of the closet" also dress in
ways that conform to societal norms of femininity and attractiveness. My comments best
describe the lesbian who is "out of the closet" and is not trying to conform to societal norms.
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ward men's standards for attractiveness and sexuality. Lesbians re-
ceive a different message from prostitution rules than do heterosexual
women, because, for lesbians, these rules are part of a larger social
order that disapproves of all of their sexual activity. If lesbians are
sex workers, they are, like heterosexual women, criminals. Even if
lesbians are not sex workers, their private sexual activities may violate
criminal laws. 13 No desired sexual activity is acceptable for a lesbian,
regardless of whether she is a sex worker. Prostitution laws highlight
the existence and desirability of a certain type of heterosexuality,
whereas sodomy laws, along with other regulations, 14 hide the exis-
tence and destroy the desirability of virtually all lesbian sexual activ-
ity.
Professor Frug's discussion of the sexualization of sex workers is
baffling, because she refers to the stories of lesbian sex workers with-
out recognizing the significance of their sexual orientation. 15 For
example, she cites "one sex worker's description of the discomfort she
experienced because she sexually responded to her customer during
an act of prostitution."'1 6 Frug concludes that "[h]er orgasm in those
circumstances broke down a distinction she sought to maintain be-
tween her work and the sexual pleasure she obtained from her non-
work-related sexual activity."'1 7 Frug, however, failed to acknowledge
the sex worker's sexual preference. The sex worker to whom Frug
referred, Judy Edelstein, has identified herself as a Jewish, lesbian
feminist.18 Describing her discomfort with having been sexually
13 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. x86, 191 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality
of Georgia's sodomy statute as applied to the private, consensual behavior of homosexuals).
The Georgia sodomy statute, like most sodomy statutes, could be applied to heterosexuals who
engage in anal or oral sex; however, such prosecutions of heterosexuals virtually never occur.
(Private sex does not include prostitution). Thus, the United States Supreme Court in Bowers
did not reach the issue of whether the Georgia statute could have constitutionally been applied
against heterosexuals. Id. at 188 n.2.
14 This Commentary cannot discuss all of the laws that coerce lesbians into making their
sexual preference invisible. For example, military regulations force lesbians to remain closeted,
see Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Recent Developments, Military Women in Non-
traditional Job Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOM-
EN'S L.J. 215, 234-38 (i99o), and child custody laws coerce lesbians to conceal their sexual
orientation to attain or retain custody of their children, see Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff,
Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REv.
691, 714-15 (1976); Annamay T. Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's Journey into Day,
8 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 219, 241-43 (1985).
15 When I refer to lesbians who are sex workers, I am referring to women who sexually
arouse men for compensation but who choose women as their sexual partners for uncompensated
sex. Although some women sell sex to other women and choose women as their partners for
uncompensated sex, I do not discuss such women in this Commentary. Nevertheless, many of
my observations could apply to them, because both their public and private sex lives are illegal.
Their situation is unique, however, because they do not depend on men for any sexual activity.
16 See Frug, supra note 2, at 1053 n.7.
17 See id.
18 See Judy Edelstein, Contributors' Notes, in SEx WoiRK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN IN THE
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aroused by one of her customers, Edelstein remembers thinking: "I
just can't believe that I had an orgasm with that jerk. I try to forget
him, to think about making love with Laura, the woman I'm with
right now. But all I can see is the customer's all-American face." 19
Frug interprets Edelstein's discomfort as a work/nonwork discomfort,
but it could also have been a heterosexual/lesbian discomfort. I sus-
pect that Edelstein might have been uncomfortable about experiencing
sexual pleasure with any man, 20 regardless of whether he had com-
pensated her for the sexual activity. Edelstein did not seem to be
concerned that her whore image from work would intrude into her
private life. Instead, she seemed to want to experience her work life
as nonsexual, even if the man was receiving sexual pleasure from her.
Sex was what she enjoyed with her female lover; work was what she
did with men for compensation. 21
Rather than sexualize Edelstein toward heterosexuality, the laws
criminalizing prostitution aided in desexualizing Edelstein. Both her
public life - providing sexual services while giving massages - and
her private life - lesbianism - were illegal. Law discouraged her
from engaging in either activity. Contrary to Professor Frug's thesis,
the law criminalizing prostitution did not successfully construct her
sexuality in a way that society finds desirable.
Although prostitution rules may not heterosexualize lesbians, other
rules may. Professor Frug argues that marriage laws and social rules
concerning violence induce women to choose monogamous heterosex-
uality.22 Marriage is structured as a potential source of financial
support for women, which makes it a plausible substitute for or
supplement to employment. 23 Social violence induces women to stay
married by leading them to rely on individual men - their husbands
- for protection against violence.24
The marriage rules also affect lesbians. They must choose lesbi-
anism in spite of, rather than because of, these rules. Some lesbians
SEX INDUSTRY 341 (Fr~drique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987) [hereinafter SEX
WORK].
19 Judy Edelstein, In the Massage Parlor, in SEX WORK, supra note iS, at 62, 63.
20 1 make this statement because Edelstein does not describe herself as a bisexual. See
Edelstein, supra note i8, at 341.
21 1 agree with Professor Frug that Edelstein describes her discomfort with being considered
a "whore" in her paid employment. That discomfort may have eventually led her to leave the
life of a sex worker. By inducing her to leave, however, society has not succeeded in inducing
her to embrace a more acceptable lifestyle of exclusive, heterosexual monogamy.
22 See Frug, supra note 2, at io62-64.
23 See id. at io64.
24 See id. at IO64-65. I am not fully convinced by Professor Frug's comments about physical
security. See id. In light of the level of violence against women within the family, it is hard
to see how a woman's physical safety generally improves by living with a man, even if he
occasionally serves as a male escort for her.
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may have relationships with men to obtain the benefits of financial
security and safety. 25 I have always found it interesting to discover
the number of women who identify themselves as lesbians (but not
bisexuals) who have also had serious relationships with men, including
marriage. That pattern seems far less true of men who identify them-
selves as gay. This sex difference may be the result of women having
greater incentives than men to try to be comfortable or happy in
heterosexual relationships. Although Professor Frug suggests that it
is hard to know how current sexual practices would change if legal
rules concerning sexual conduct changed, 26 I think the outcome is
easy to predict. At a minimum, many more women would seek sexual
relations with other women. In other words, given the benefits of the
rules that Professor Frug describes, it is surprising that any woman
would "choose" lesbianism. Not surprisingly, few women find them-
selves able to live out such a choice in a system of rules powerfully
favoring heterosexuality, monogamy, and passivity.
So how do lesbians manage to defy the powerful force of the rules
that Frug describes? As I have discussed elsewhere, the answer lies
partly in the "cracks in the wall" of patriarchy. 27 For example, being
a sex worker while also being a lesbian may have been a part of Judy
Edelstein's strategy for survival within a patriarchal world, because
it enabled her to use men to acquire financial security while not
conforming her private life to heterosexual norms. For some women,
the occupation of sex worker may serve as a crack in the wall, whereas
for other women, the occupation may be a form of subordination and
exploitation. By considering the socialization of lesbian sexuality
along with the socialization of heterosexual sexuality, we can better
understand the full scope of society's construction of the female body
and develop law reform strategies to open the cracks wider for a
broader range of women.
B. Terrorization
Prostitution rules, Professor Frug argues, also endanger sex work-
ers' lives and make their work terrifying. Thus, women are induced
to choose marriage rather than prostitution. Because she focuses ex-
clusively on heterosexual prostitutes, Frug cannot fully explain why
some women become prostitutes, despite the terrorization they face.
2S Professor Frug's discussion of lesbians is incomplete, see id. at xo66, but she clearly
understood that economic and safety incentives "make a male partner more advantageous for
non-sexual reasons than a same-sex partner for women," id.
26 See id. at i063.
27 See Ruth Colker, Feminist Consciousness and the State: A Basis for Cautious Optimism,
go COLUM. L. REV. 1146, 116o-6i (iggo) (book review).
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Additionally, Frug ignores some legal rules that make prostitution
terrorizing.
Lesbians always face terrorization because both their private and
public lives are typically illegal. 28 Moreover, lesbians face the special
dangers of violence against lesbian and gay people, regardless of
whether they are prostitutes. The terrorization that a lesbian faces as
a prostitute is therefore not a unique problem in her life. For a
heterosexual woman, however, marriage may be less terrorizing than
prostitution. The differential rate of terrorization in the public and
private life of a heterosexual prostitute may act as a stronger deterrent
to engaging in prostitution than it would for a lesbian. The existence
of prostitution despite terrorization may be explained best by under-
standing how society makes the lives of certain undesirable women
(for example, lesbians, poor women, women of color) so dangerous
that the terrorization inherent in prostitution is an "acceptable" danger.
Professor Frug would have better understood the terrorization ele-
ment in all prostitutes' lives if she had investigated sodomy statutes
- an area of the law that is often thought to be inapplicable to
heterosexual activity - along with prostitution regulations. (Frug's
list of six areas of the law that terrorize prostitutes omits sodomy
statutes).2 9 Sodomy statutes permit the state to enhance the penalty
for prostitution by also bringing a sodomy prosecution, 30 despite the
fact that unprotected intercourse presents a more serious risk of HIV
infection for a female prostitute and her client than sodomy (for
example, oral sex).3 1 Although sodomy statutes are an important
aspect of the terrorization that many prostitutes face, they are rarely
a part of feminist law reform discussions concerning prostitution. A
heterosexual perspective makes it easy to overlook laws normally
associated with lesbian and gay sexual activity, but which actually
affect all women.
C. Maternalization
Finally, Professor Frug describes how prostitution rules, work
rules, and family law rules maternalize women. Many of these rules
have a dematernalizing effect on lesbians. A crucial difference be-
tween lesbians and heterosexual women is the application of the ma-
ternal stereotype. Heterosexual women are viewed as presumptively
28 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
29 See Frug, supra note 2, at 1054.
3o See, e.g., Louisiana v. Neal, 500 So. 2d 374, 376 (La. 1987) (affirming a conviction of
the codefendant for a crime against nature and prostitution).
31 Although studies have found that oral sex is not a major source of transmission of the
HIV virus, it presents some risk unless a condom is used. See, e.g., Marsha F. Goldsmith, As
AIDS Epidemic Approaches Second Decade, Report Examines What Has Been Learned, 264
JAMA 431, 433 (299o); Letter from Dr. John Petricciani, 262 JAMA 2231, 2231 (1989).
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maternal, whereas lesbians are viewed as unsuited and unable to bear
children. For example, I once shared with a male colleague the fact
that I was considering pregnancy. At the time, I was intimately
involved with a woman. My colleague was shocked by the idea that
I could become pregnant. He seemed to assume that my involvement
with a woman had destroyed my biological capacity to bear children.
Since I have become intimately involved with a man, however, no
one has reacted with surprise to my pregnancies. Somehow, my uterus
was figuratively returned when my sexual partner changed from a
woman to a man. Similarly, when I have debated lesbian and gay
rights issues, my opponent has often assumed that the only way a
lesbian could obtain custody of a child was through adoption. I must
therefore point out that lesbians can also obtain children through
childbirth. However, the law goes to great extremes to separate les-
bians and gay men from children. For example, even a jurisdiction
such as Denmark, which recognizes lesbian and gay marriage through
a registered partnership act, has withheld the benefits of adoption
from "married" gay couples. 32 Similarly, our laws and rules with
respect to artificial insemination have historically restricted lesbians
from eligibility.33
Another source of the dematernalization of lesbians is our family-
based workplace rules - rules that Professor Frug describes as ma-
ternalizing women. Professor Frug argues that discrimination against
women in the workplace makes it more likely that women will leave
the workplace to raise and care for children. Other family-based
workplace rules, however, dematernalize lesbians, not because they
discriminate against women generally, but because they discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, employer-based
health insurance is made available exclusively on a family and class 34
32 See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I LAwv & SEXUAL-
ITY: REv. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, io-iI n.3 (1991). Similarly, when Massachusetts
passed a gay rights statute, opponents of the statute argued that lesbian and gay people should
not be able to adopt children under the auspices of the statute. A compromise was eventually
reached in which an amendment was added that would, on its face, appear to apply to both
gay and straight people if their sexual orientation were "an obstacle to the psychological, or
physical well-being of the child." Joyce P. Cain, Massachusetts' 1989 Sexual Orientation Non-
discrimination Statute, x LAW & SEXUALITY: REv. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 285, 298
n.93 (I991). The legislatures in New Hampshire and Florida have passed legislation barring
lesbians and gay men from adopting children. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 53o A.2d 21,
25 (N.H. 1987) (holding that a proposed New Hampshire law that prevented homosexuals from
adopting children or becoming foster parents did not violate the Constitution); Seebol v. Farie,
No. 90-923-CA-IS (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. io, 1991) (overturning Florida's ban on gay adoptions).
33 See Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A
Callfor an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. I, 3, 17 (I981).
34 Professor Frug's discussion of workplace rules typically describes rules that affect middle-
class workers who are able to obtain benefits such as health insurance. Workers who receive




basis, and thus the lesbian family is excluded from recognition and
coverage. Consequently, it is more difficult for a middle-class lesbian
couple to afford to bear and raise a child than it is for a middle class
heterosexual couple to do so. Our health insurance rules make it
financially feasible for some heterosexual women to leave the work-
place to raise children while they retain coverage under their hus-
band's plan. Those same rules make it financially difficult for a
lesbian to make a comparable choice, because the parent that stops
work to care for the child cannot obtain insurance through her partner.
Family law rules, however, sometimes serve to maternalize lesbi-
ans, as well as heterosexual women. Frug assumes that maternali-
zation through legal rules is always bad for women. For lesbians,
maternalization could be beneficial. For example, Frug argues that it
is harmful for women to be maternalized through rules that favor
women's parenting roles. But for lesbians, who often face nonmater-
nal stereotypes in the courtroom, 35 a legal presumption that they could
be good parents might be beneficial. 36 If the maternal presumption
were applied to lesbians, it might make it easier for them to undermine
the courts' stereotypes with respect to their fitness as mothers. With-
out that presumption, they are simply, like prostitutes, unwelcome
criminals.
ITl. APPLICATION TO LAW REFORM: THE ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY
CAMPAIGN AND THE ABORTION RIGHTS MOVEMENT
An anti-essentialist perspective can also promote effective law re-
form strategies. Professor Frug makes the connection between the
theoretical and the practical by showing how her thesis applies to the
MacKinnon/Dworkin anti-pornography campaign. She hopes that ex-
amining the ordinance campaign closely will help "advance the pros-
pects of an abortion reform effort that the Supreme Court might thrust
upon us."'3 7 One familiar criticism of the ordinance effort, she argues,
is the alliance between feminist ordinance advocates and nonfeminist
conservatives. Frug, however, claims that this alliance is positive,
because it "successfully engage[s] nonfeminist political camps." 38 She
acknowledges that this engagement came at the expense of feminist
35 See, e.g., Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 14, at 705-14; Sheppard, supra note 14, at 241-
43-
36 See, e.g., In re Diehl, No. 2-90-1217, 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 1972, *22 (Ill. App., Nov.
22, iggi) (denying custody to an alleged lesbian by applying a reverse tender years presumption
and stating that because of the child's "tender years . . . it is in her best interest not to be
exposed to a lesbian relationship," but overturning restrictions on visitation imposed by the trial
court).
37 Frug, supra note 2, at io68.
38 Id. at 1070.
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unity, but "that breaching this unity is a necessary component of
feminist efforts against women's oppressions. '" 39
Clearly, coalition building is important in any political campaign.
However, Professor Frug does not sufficiently probe the basis of the
political differences in the anti-pornography ordinance campaign.
Among the feminist critics of the ordinance were lesbians who voiced
concerns that the ordinance's broad definition of pornography would
limit their ability to experiment with new forms of sexuality through
the use of pornographic materials. 40 They argued that women have
been socialized to be sexually passive and therefore to partake only
in what was described as "vanilla" (or bland) sexual behavior. Within
a lesbian relationship, in which both partners have been socialized in
this manner, that problem can be quite acute. Hence, these critics
feared that the "Vanilla-Sex Gestapo"4 1 would try to encourage les-
bians to be even more sexually passive.
Professor Frug's attribution of this disagreement to differences in
postmodern philosophy42 is inaccurate. As postmodernists, critics of
the ordinance understood that the images of sexuality that they might
create with their own pornography might help women escape vanilla
sex.4 3 They wanted to use pornography constructively. Because they
were a distinct and invisible feminist minority that had come forward
to raise specific objections, the ordinance organizers had an obligation
to listen to them and compromise with them to overcome the pre-
vailing essentialist understanding of women's views concerning por-
nography. It was especially important for fhe feminist proponents to
consider the views of the feminist critics, because the critics agreed
with the basic postmodern premise of the movement - that pornog-
raphy can have a transformative effect on society.
There is an instructive analogy to the abortion rights movement.
For more than a decade, African-American feminists have been saying
that the abortion rights movement has not been speaking to their
concerns; 44 that pro-choice leaders have not paid sufficient attention
39 Id. at 1070.
40 For an excellent collection on the sex debate, see PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING
FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984). Many of my comments stem from several
conversations with lesbians regarding the anti-pornography movement.
41 1 have found the term "vanilla sex" in lesbian literature. See, e.g., Martha Equinox, IfI
Ask You to Tie Me Up, Will You Still Want to Love Me?, in COMING To POWER: WRITINGS
AND GRAPHICS ON LESBIAN S/M 29, 31 (SAMOIS ed., 1982) (distinguishing between sado-
masochistic sex and "vanilla sex"). I have not, however, found the term "Vanilla-Sex Gestapo,"
which I presume is original to Mary Joe. Frug, supra note 2, at 1070.
42 See Frug, supra note 2, at 1070.
43 See Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce, et al., in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69,
69-75, 102-o5, 128-32 (1987-1988).
44 See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 202-2I (1981).
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to forced sterilization, lack of prenatal care, lack of support for chil-
dren in poverty, and other policies that limit the choices of poor
women. For example, white feminists did not respond with much of
an outcry when Harris v. McRae45 was decided, and yet we anticipate
a feminist riot if Roe v. Wade46 is overturned. Instead of addressing
the full range of choices in women's lives, the abortion rights move-
ment has focused narrowly on the single issue of the formal right to
"choose" an abortion, while it continues to ignore issues of afforda-
bility.47 It is not enough for the movement's leadership to acknowl-
edge splintering among women on the abortion issue. Instead, femi-
nists need to ask whether particular groups of disadvantaged women
have been left out of the feminist union by the essentialist way in
which the priorities of the movement have been constructed.
Professor Frug's argument that the ordinance campaign should
have attempted to deconstruct pornography rather than destroy it48
has important implications for the abortion rights movement as well.
Frug criticizes the ordinance campaign for being too male in its lan-
gnage and rhetorical style. This final observation by Professor Frug
brings her in seeming agreement with the feminist critics of the or-
dinance. Both were trying to open the discussion of pornography
beyond the simplified picture offered by the ordinance advocates.
Unfortunately, the feminist critics also used highly dichotomized and
hierarchical arguments in expressing their views. But one might argue
that they had no choice - it is difficult to respond to a male style of
argumentation in a female style.
4 9
What, then, is the appropriate lesson for the abortion rights move-
ment? In my own work, I have tried to encourage less dichotomized
discussions about issues related to abortion.50 We need to consider,
for example, how "choice" and "life" are not bipolar opposites. Women
who choose abortions or choose to forego medical intervention during
their pregnancies often make those choices out of a respect for life,
including the lives of their families, their future children, and them-
selves. 5 ' I hope that Professor Frug's manuscript will- inspire us to
4S 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (I98O) (upholding congressional limitations on Medicaid payments
for abortions).
46 410 U.S. 1I3 (1973).
47 For a discussion of the abortion issue in a reproductive health context, see Colker, supra
note 5, at 346-5o.
48 See Frug, supra note 2, at 1072.
49 For further discussion of this dilemma, see Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxy-
moron? - A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 137, 137-68 (199o).
so For further discussion, see RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-
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find ways to join in public debates in less polarized ways than we
adopted during the anti-pornography and abortion rights movements.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Frug's manuscript has helped me see more clearly how
legal doctrine constructs women's bodies by sexualizing, terrorizing,
and maternalizing them. Unlike other feminists who have focused on
one or the other of these issues, she has brought them together in one
complete work. Rather than being a "linchpin" theorist, she has
clarified the variety of ways in which law maintains and constructs
subordination of women through law.
My critique reflects a concern with the extent to which she deviated
from her original intention - to provide us with a "localized disrup-
tion" rather than a total theory.5 2 Many of the rules that she describes
have an opposing or enhanced effect on lesbians. Through a more
complete exploration of the diversity of women's experiences, a
sharper image of the actual operation of female socialization might
emerge. Certain women are oversocialized as female whereas other
women are excluded from the category altogether. It is through this
combination of effects that socialization steers women toward femi-
ninity.
Thank you, Mary Joe, for providing us with many insights in your
thoughtful essay. The discussions with you must continue.
52 Professor Frug attempted to write a "localized disruption" rather than a total theory, see
Frug, supra note 2, at 1046. She seems to have been influenced by Catharine MacKinnon's
work, see id., although MacKinnon attempts to formulate a "total theory" rather than a localized
disruption. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
An Agenda for Theory in FEMINIST THEORY x, 6 n.7 (Nannerl 0. Keohane, Michelle Z. Rosaldo
& Barbara C. Gelpi eds., 1982) ("I aspire to include all women in the term 'women' in some
way, without violating the particularity of any woman's experience."). The reference to
MacKinnon is baffling to me, except to suggest that Professor Frug was possibly torn between
writing a total theory and writing a localized disruption.
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